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LEGISLATIVE NOTES
NEW JERSEY RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES ACT
The New Jersey legislature recently passed a bill designed to
protect purchasers of goods under retail installment contracts.1
This bill, amending the Retail Installment Sales Act of 1960,2
eliminates the use of the holder in due course doctrine and waiver
of defenses clauses in retail installment sales. Under the holder in
due course doctrine,3 if certain conditions are met, 4 a finance
company 5 that purchases a note and retail installment sales con-
tract from a seller 6 can demand full payment on the note notwith-
standing any defenses the buyer might have been able to assert
against the seller on the underlying installment contract. 7 When a
buyer enters into a retail installment sales agreement which con-
1 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16C-I, 17:16C-38.1 to -38.4 (7 New Jersey Session Law
Service 1692 (1971)) [hereinafter referred to in text as Retail Installment Sales Act]. The
Act, signed by the governor of New Jersey on January 1I, 1972, became effective on April
9, 1972.2 1d. § 17:16C-1 (1960).
3 Id. § 12A:3-302 (1962) [the Uniform Commercial Code is contained in N.J. STAT.
ANN., tit. I 2A, hereinafter cited as UCC].
* UCC § 3-302 provides that a holder in due course must:
I) be a holder as defined in UCC § 1-201(20);
2) hold an instrument that under UCC § 3-102(1)(e) is negotiable, as defined
in UCC § 3-104;
3) take the instrument for value as defined in UCC § 3-303;
4) take the instrument in good faith as defined in UCC § 1-201(19); and
5) take the instrument without notice, as defined in UCC § 3-304, that it is
overdue or has been dishonored, or of any defense against or claim to it on
the part of any person.
* The term "finance company" is used in this note to mean any financial organization
which frequently purchases consumer notes from retail sellers. This definition includes
commercial banks and credit unions as well as finance companies.
1 Statistics compiled for the Federal Reserve Banks demonstrate the widespread use of
this practice. Of the total installment credit outstanding in the United States as of October,
1970, retail sellers provided only 13 percent, while commercial banks extended 42 percent,
and finance companies extended 3 1 percent. These last two figures include direct as well
as indirect (assigned) loans and so must be regarded with caution. See 56 FED. REs. BULL.
A54 (Dec. 1970).
7 UCC § 3-305 permits a holder in due course to take the instrument free from all claims
(generally claims of title) to it and all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom
the holder has not dealt (excepting the "real defenses" set forth in UCC §§ 3-305(a)-(e) ).
In contrast, a mere holder under UCC § 3-306 takes the instrument subject to all valid
claims to it and to most defenses available to the defending party.
UCC § 3-305 does not prevent the retail buyer from asserting any claims he may have
on the retail installment sales contract against the retail seller. A problem usually develops,
however, when the seller becomes bankrupt or leaves the jurisdiction after signing the
contract but before performing completely.
SPRING 1972] Installment Sales Act
tains a waiver of defenses clause,8 he waives his right to assert
some or all of the defenses he might have had to a claim for
payment of the unpaid balance on the installment contract held by
the assignee-finance company, irrespective of whether the finance
company qualifies as a holder in due course. 9
The effect of the enactment of the New Jersey bill is that a
"retail buyer"1 0 may now assert against an assignee of the in-
stallment contract or subsequent "holder"" of the negotiable note
any defenses he has against the retail installment seller. The new
law would appear to be one of the most comprehensive laws of its
type to be enacted. 12 However the draftsmen apparently left a
significant loophole, appropriately termed the "specious cash
sale, 1' 3 which, if exploited, could negate the intended effect of the
new law. This note will analyze the bill, compare it with the
relevant provisions of the National Consumer Act (NCA) 14 and
8 Subject to other state law, UCC § 9-206 recognizes the validity of such clauses except
as to defenses of a type which. may be asserted against a holder in due course. The
assignee, to invoke such a clause, must take the assignment for value, in good faith, and
without notice of a claim or defense. While these conditions parallel those under UCC
§ 3-302 for the holder in due course, the waiver of defenses clause is designed to cover
those cases not subject to the holder in due course doctrine, as, for example, where the
buyer signs a non-negotiable note.
The courts have split on the question whether such clauses are against public policy.
For a compilation of cases on both sides, see Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good
Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954); Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, 68 COL. L. REV. 387 (1968).
9 A typical clause reads:'
Buyer hereby acknowledges notice that the contract may be assigned and
that assignees will rely upon the agreements contained in this paragraph, and
agrees that the liability of the Buyer to any assignee shall be immediate and
absolute and not affected by any default whatsoever of the Seller signing this
contract; and in order to induce assignees to purchase this contract, the
Buyer further agrees not to set up any claim against such a Seller as a
defense, counterclaim, or offset to any action by any assignee for the unpaid
balance of the purchase price or for possession of the property.
Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 106, 236 A.2d 405, 408 (1967).
10 N. J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-1(d) (7 New Jersey Session Law Service 1692 (1971))
defines "retail buyer." It is important to note that to be a retail buyer one must purchase
goods from a retail seller "not for the purpose of resale." The import of the above
restrictions is that the goods must be used for a personal purpose before their sale will fall
within the scope of the New Jersey law. Purchases of goods for the purpose of building or
maintaining an inventory for later resale or commercial use are not covered by the New
Jersey law. Note also that definition of "goods," id. § 17:16C-l(a), also limits the definition
of a retail buyer.
'1 "Holder" is defined in id. § 17:1 6C-I(m).
12 In N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1972, at I, col. 5, it was reported that a survey made by the
New Jersey Banking Association revealed that, through 1970, seventeen states had
enacted similar laws. According to the Banking Association, none of these laws, however,
went as far as the new law in New Jersey.
13 For a discussion of the specious cash sale and of the New York Specious Cash Sales
Act, see Legislative Note, New York Specious Cash Sales Act, 5 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 145
(1971).
14 NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT (First Final Draft
1970) [hereinafter cited as NCA].
Journal of Law Reform
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), 15 and will discuss
the loophole and the ways it can be closed.
I. ANALYSIS OF THE RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES ACT
A. The Scope of the Act.
The scope of the Retail Installment Sales Act is limited to a
specified range of consumer transactions. The Act does not apply
to sales of services, but applies only to sales of "goods." 16 Goods
by definition do not include real property, money or choses in
action, goods sold for commercial or business use, or personal
property having a cash price greater than $7,500.17 The scope of
the Act is narrower than that of both the NCA, which applies to
sales of services and money as well as personal property, 18 and
the UCCC, which applies to sales of certain interests in land as
well as personal property. 19 That the Act excludes sales of ser-
vices may be particularly significant in light of the fact that sales
of services are frequently intermingled with sales of goods. 20 It is
possible that such sales may be excluded from the scope of the
new law even though the nature of these transactions may parallel
the nature of those covered by the Act.
The Act is further limited to those of the above consumer
transactions involving a "retail installment contract." 21 This con-
tract must be entered into in New Jersey and must involve a
"retail seller" 2 2 and a "retail buyer."'23 The contract must also
evidence an agreement to pay the "retail purchase price of goods
or any part thereof in two or more installments over a period of
time." 24 Neither the NCA nor the UCCC limits its scope solely
'5 UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (Final Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as UCCC].
For a comparison of the UCCC and the NCA provisions regarding negotiability, see Note,
Limitations on Sales Agreements Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the
National ConsumerAct, 56 IOWA L. REV. 171 (1970).
16 N. J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16C-38.1 to -38.2 (7 New Jersey Session Law Service
1693-94 (1971) ) limits the Act to transactions involving a "retail installment contract."
Such a contract must be for the sale of "goods." Id. § 17:16C- l(b).
17 1d. § 17:16C-I(a).
18 The scope of the NCA is limited to a "consumer credit transaction" as defined in
NCA § 1.301(10).
19 The UCCC applies to a "consumer credit sale" as defined in UCCC § 2.104(l).
20 Examples of such sales include the sale of memberships to health clubs, contracts for
the delivery of milk, and repair contracts which include the installation of new parts.
21 See note 14 supra.
2 2 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-I(c) (7 New Jersey Session Law Service 1692 (1971))
defines "retail seller."
23 Id. § 17: 16C- I(b). The definition of"retail buyer" is discussed in note 10 supra.
24 Id.
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to installment sales. 25 Thus, a purchase price payable in whole in
ninety days and subject to a finance charge would be covered by
the NCA and the UCCC but would not be subject to the New
Jersey law.
Significantly, the term "retail installment contract" may cover
transactions which, although not legally classifiable as sales of
goods, appear in substance to be identical to such sales. These
transactions include a contract for bailment or a lease where the
bailee or lessee agrees to pay as compensation a sum substantially
equivalent to the value of the goods and where the bailee or lessee
has the- option of becoming the owner of the goods upon full
compliance with the terms of the agreement.2 6 An important ex-
ception here is, however, that the New Jersey law does not cover
consumer loans executed in connection with a retail sale.2 7 The
Retail Installment Sales Act in this sense parallels the UCCC,28
but appears to be more restrictive than the NCA provision which
defines a "consumer credit transaction" to include sales involving
"consumer credit sales, consumer leases, and consumer loans." 29
B. Statutory Provisions
The Retail Installment Sales Act focuses on eliminating the use
of waiver of defenses clauses included in retail installment con-
tracts and on precluding a finance company's reliance on the
holder in due course doctrine to defeat the retail buyer's defenses
on the contract. According to the New Jersey law "no retail
installment contract shall contain any provision relieving the hold-
er, or other assignee, from liability for any civil remedy sounding
in contract which the retail buyer may have against the retail
seller." 30 Thus, the New Jersey law, like the NCA,3 1 provides an
25Under NCA § 1.301(10), the contract must be an "obligation which is payable in
installments or for which credit a finance change is or may be imposed" (emphasis added).
Under UCCC § 2.104(l)(d) the contract obligation must be payable in installments or
must involve a finance charge.2 8 N.J. STAT. ANN. 17:16C-1(b) (7 New Jersey Session Law Service 1692 (1971)).
27The definition of "goods" expressly excludes "money or choses in action." Id.
§ 17:16C-I(a). Furthermore, although the definition of "retail installment contract" in-
cludes contracts for lease or bailment of goods, it does not include contracts involving
consumer loans. Id. § 17: 16C- I(b).
28 UCCC §§ 2.403-.404 cover a consumer credit sale or a consumer lease but make no
mention of consumer loans. Neither the definition of "consumer credit sale" in UCC
§ 2.104(0) nor the definition of "consumer lease" in UCC § 2.106 includes consumer
loans.
-~ NCA § 1.301(00).
30 N. J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-38.2 (7 New Jersey Session Law Service 1693-94
(1971)).
31 NCA § 2.406.
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absolute ban on the use of waiver of defenses clauses in any
contract which falls within the scope of the Act.32
In dealing with negotiable notes executed in connection with a
retail installment contract, the Retail Installment Sales Act pre-
vents the application of the holder in due course doctrine to the
holder of the note by adopting an absolute ban on the use of
negotiable notes in retail installment sales. 3 3 Since the holder in
due course doctrine can only apply to negotiable instruments,3 4
the Act in effect destroys the finance company's ability to shield
itself from a retail buyer's complaints by means of the holder in
due course doctrine.
Moreover, the Act attempts to ensure that the consumer recog-
nizes that he is signing a note and that this note entails certain
financial obligations. The Act requires that any note executed
with a retail installment contract contain the words "consumer
note" in large bold type.3 5 In addition, the note may not contain
security agreements which are not normally found on a negotiable
note.36 Since the retail seller does not have to provide a note
which comports with the requirements of negotiability,3 7 the seller
could conceivably include promises on the face of the note which
might otherwise appear in the sales contract. 38 While the Act does
not place an absolute ban on the use of additional terms in the
note, it does expressly prohibit the creation of a security interest
in the note.3 9 However, it would appear that the seller can still
create this security interest in the installment contract. 40 Thus it
can be argued that the impetus of the above requirement is to
32 The Retail Installment Sales Act has a much broader effect than the UCCC. UCCC
§ 2.404, Alternatives A and B. For a discussion of UCCC § 2.404 and how it compares to
NCA § 2.406, see Note, supra note 15, at 180-8 1.
3 N. J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-38.2 (7 New Jersey Session Law Service 1693-94
(197 1) ). This parallels the prohibition embodied in NCA § 2.405.
34 See note 4 supra.
3 N. J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-38.2 (7 New Jersey Session Law Service 1693-94-
(1971)).
36 Id.
37 Under the Act the use of negotiable notes in retail installment contracts is no longer
permissible. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra.
38 Under UCC § 3-104 an instrument, to be negotiable, must contain an "unconditional
promise or order to pay a sum certain in money and no other promise, order, obligation or
power given by the maker or drawer except as authorized in this Article" (emphasis
added). The exceptions are listed in UCC §§ 3-105 and 3-112. Once the instrument is
made non-negotiable by operation of law, the seller is no longer bound by UCCC § 3- 104.
39N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-38.2 (7 New Jersey Session Law Service 1693-94
(1971)).
40 That part of the Act prohibiting the creation of a security interest in the note deals
solely with the note and does not apply to the retail installment sales contract. Id. The
terms of the contract are covered in id. § 17:16C-38.1. There is no restriction on the
creation of a security interest in that section.
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ensure that the consumer is not deceived by the placement of the
terms of a security agreement in an unusual place.
Unlike a recently enacted New York law,4' the New Jersey
Act does not provide that a buyer can assert his contractual rights
against an assignee only as a defense to or set-off against a claim
made by an assignee thereby limiting the buyer's claim to the
amount due on the note.42 Under the New Jersey Act, like the
NCA,43 a buyer can not only assert his claim affirmatively against
the assignee but can claim damages which exceed the amount due
on the note as long as the damages claimed do not exceed the
"time sales price" under the contract4 4 However, the New Jersey
law states that the buyer can only assert those rights which arise
"out of the retail installment contract or any seperate instrument
executed in connection therewith."' '
Finance companies violating the Retail Installment Sales Act
are subject to two sanctions. First, a criminal fine may be levied
for each offense.4 6 Second, the finance company may be barred
from recovering "finance, delinquency, collection, repossession,
or refinancing charges" in any action based on a contract which
violates the New Jersey law. 47
II. THE SPECIOUS CASH SALE
A. The Problem
As has been mentioned, the Retail Installment Sales Act does
not cover consumer loans. 48 This failure permits a retail seller and
finance company to engage in a transaction described as a "speci-
ous cash sale" 49 or "interlocking loan." 50 In a specious cash sale
41 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403.6 (McKinney Supp. 1970).42 Under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-38.2 (7 New Jersey Session Law Service 1693
(1971)) a "subsequent holder of a consumer note is subject to all claims and defenses of
the retail buyer against the retail seller" (emphasis added).
For example, when a buyer has paid $600 on a $ 1,000 note executed in connection with
a retail installment sale, he is limited under New York law to asserting his rights defen-
sively and his claim is limited to $400 even if the damages he has suffered are larger. In
New Jersey, this same buyer does not have to wait until the finance company sues before
he can assert his rights and the amount hecan recover is not limited to the unpaid balance
on the note.
43 NCA § 2.406.
44N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-38.2 (7 New Jersey Session Law Service 1693 (1971)). It
should be noted that the New Jersey law specifically excepts sales of new motor vehicles.
In these sales the buyer may seek only "the time balance," that is, the amount owing at the
time the claim or defense is asserted against the assignee. Id.
4 Id.
46 Id. § 17:16C-38.3. The fine is to be not more than $500 for each offense.
47 Id. § 17:16C-38.4.
48 See notes 27- 29 and accompanying text supra.
49 See Legislative Note, supra note 13.
5o See NCA § 2.407, entitled "Interlocking Loans and Sales."
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the retail seller does not extend credit directly to the buyer but
engages in a two-part transaction with the aid of a finance com-
pany. In the first part of the transaction the finance company
makes an installment loan to the retail buyer. The buyer then
takes the cash obtained from the loan and purchases the goods
from the retail seller. When the dealer directs the consumer to a
"willing" lender he "just happens to know" and especially when
the dealer provides the loan forms and helps the consumer fill
them out, such a transaction closely resembles a retail installment
sale. Nevertheless, as long as the sale is for "cash," the sanctions
and restrictions of the New Jersey Act are arguably inapplicable,
and the holder in due course doctrine or a waiver of defenses
clause may apply to the sale. 51 Simply by making a paper work
adjustment, the finance company can deny the consumer the
protection that the Act would otherwise have provided. 52
Although no empirical data are available to indicate the extent
to which retail sellers and finance companies utilize the specious
cash sale, there is some reason to believe that they do engage in
this type of transaction when it appears to be the only means of
protecting themselves from contractual claims of the buyer. In
jurisdictions that have enacted consumer protection laws similar
to the New Jersey Act, studies reveal a decided upswing in
consumer loans distinct from retail installment sales. 53 While the
resort to legitimate direct loans seems to be a beneficial
side-product of this trend,5 4 the use of the specious cash sale has,
in fact, presented serious problems. 55 The draftsmen of the NCA,
51 See notes 2 1- 24 and accompanying text supra.
52 See Note, supra note 15, at 18 1.
53 A study made in Massachusetts by the staff of the Wisconsin Law Review indicated
that more than 40 percent of the responding financial institutions felt that the new
Massachusetts consumer protection laws (MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255, § 12C, and
ch. 255d, § 10(6) (1968)) caused a shift toward direct loans. See Comment, Consumer
Protection- The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer Financing, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 505,
542-45 n.98 (1968).
A study of the home improvement loan business in Connecticut after the passage of the
Connecticut Home Soliciation Sales Act of 1967 (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-134 to
-143 (Supp. 1968), providing that the obligation to pay arising from a home solicitation sale
cannot be evidenced by a negotiable instrument) indicated that many financing institutions
have switched to the use of direct loans to the consumer, rather than indirect loans through
the dealer. One bank was reported to have shifted its resources to advertising for con-
sumers rather than soliciting dealers and found that the change had increased its direct
loan business while decreasing the number of defaults. See Note, A Case Study of the
Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off
Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618, 642 (1969).
54 See Note, supra note 53, at 654- 55.
55 See statement by New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller in McKinney's Session
Law News of New York No. 5, A.258-59 (1971). The governor states in part:
Since [the enactment of the New York consumer protection law], how-
ever, a number of unscrupulous merchants and finance companies, partic-
[VOL. 5:3
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in light of the above, included a provision to remedy the matter.56
In addition, because of what it considered to be extensive and
abusive use of the specious cash sale, the New York legislature,
which had previously enacted statutes similar to the New Jersey
Act,57 found it necessary to enact a further law to remedy the
problem. 58 In spite of the New York experience, it appears that
the New Jersey Retail Installment Sales Act fails to account for
the problem presented by the specious cash sale.
B. Possible Responses to the Problem
In order to determine the severity of the problem created by
the specious cash sale, it is necessary to examine initially the
underlying goals of legislation such as the New Jersey Act and,
thereafter, to determine the effect of the specious cash sale upon
them. Three major goals have been suggested for legislative enact-
ments limiting the use of negotiable notes and waiver of defenses
clauses in retail installment contracts: to force finance companies
to screen retail sellers more cautiously before extending credit;59
to increase the bargaining power of the buyer in retail installment
ularly in poverty areas, have managed to get around the intent of the 1970
law through the use of the so-called "specious cash sale."
Id. at 258. See also Legislative Note, supra note 13, at 145-46.
56 NCA § 2.407.
5 7 N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 403.3(a) (McKinney Supp. 1970) makes waiver of defenses
clauses in retail installment transactions unenforceable. See note 41 supra for the law
eliminating negotiability of consumer notes executed in connection with retail installment
sales.5 8 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 252-255 (McKinney's Session Law News of New York
No. 5, Ch. 605 (1971)). For a discussion of this law, see Legislative Note, supra note 13.
59 The argument here turns on the fact that the finance companies are the most able to
regulate retail dealers. Most consumers do not understand that legal implications of the
language contained in the contract. See Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A
Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COL. L. REV. 455, 472 (1964), and Shuchman, Consumer
Credit by Adhesion Contracts 11, 35 TEMP. L. REV. 281, 287 (1962).
Furthermore, the organization of consumer interests into a meaningful bargaining unit
which can bargain with, much less police, the retail merchant is at a very rudimentary
stage. See Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New
UCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 272, 281 (1969).
On the other hand, the finance companies seem to have a greater ability to investigate
and evaluate the reliability of their seller-assignors and they possess the potent economic
weapon of granting or refusing to grant credit. See Jordan & Warren, The Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, 68 COL. L. REV. 387, 436 (1968); Murphy, Lawyers for the Poor
View the UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 298, 320 (1969); and the Uniform Commercial Code
Commentary, Judicial and Statutory Limitations on the Rights of a 'Holder in Due
Course' in Consumer Transactions, II B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 90, 91 (1969).
An empirical study was undertaken in Connecticut to see if, in fact, tighter policing had
resulted from the passage of a law eliminating the holder in due course doctrine in home
solicitation sales. The study showed that some policing had in fact occurred but that the
criteria used may not have been too relevant to the competency of the seller-dealer. The
criteria cited included the size of the business and the number of years the business had
dealt with the finance company. See Note, supra note 53.
SPRING 1972]
Journal of Law Reform [VoL. 5:3
contract disputes; 60 and to shift the initial contract loss to the
party who is best able to bear it.61
The use of the specious cash sale could seriously impair the
effectuation of all three of these goals. The "consumer loan"
exclusion allows a finance company to avoid the responsibilities
imposed under the Retail Installment Sales Act and, in effect,
allows the company to drift back into the posture that created the
problems the New Jersey legislature was trying to solve: the
company would not have to police those dealers to whom it
extended credit because it would be protected from loss; the
consumer would still face the holder in due course doctrine and
the waiver of defenses clause impediments to his right to sue on
the contract; and the consumer, not the finance company, would
bear the initial contract loss caused by the retail dealer's default
or bankruptcy.
While the New York state legislature enacted a statute to close
the loophole, the New Jersey state legislature perhaps need not go
as far. Several courts have recently held that if the finance com-
pany has had a fair degree of involvement with the retail dealer,
the consumer may attack the finance company's position as a
holder in due course. 62 Although a majority of jurisdictions have
80 The policy here is to encourage consumers to exercise their private rights against
retail sellers and finance companies and thereby to increase regulation of such companies.
The value of private rights to the consumer is no greater than his ability to assert them in a
court of law. The problem is that the use of default judgments coupled with the restrictions
placed by the holder in due course doctrine and the waiver of defenses clauses has all but
led to a breakdown of the private remedy. As an empirical study indicates, the creditor can
expect the defendant to default in the majority of suits filed. See Projects, Resort to the
Legal Process in Collecting Debts from High Risk Credit Buyers in Los Angeles-
Alternative Methods for Allocating Present Costs, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 879, 879-80
(1967).
By forcing the finance company to answer to the defenses or claims of the buyer against
the seller and by providing monetary rewards to those who pursue their remedies, the
consumer laws attempted to re-establish the effectiveness of the private remedy. See
Uniform Commercial Code Commentary, supra note 59, at 107-08.
"1 It is generally recognized that the finance company is more able to avoid the loss by
exercising extensive regulation of the dealers to whom it extends credit or by a mere threat
to cut off all sources of credit to the dealer. Furthermore, if initial loss must be borne by a
particular party, the finance company is most able to bear that loss without disastrous
effects. See Kripke, supra note 59, at 472, and Note. Consumer Financing, Negotiable
Instruments, and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Solution to the Judicial Dilemma, 55
CORNELL L. REV. 611, 613 (1970).
Moreover, fairness dictates that the part receiving the benefit-the profits-of the credit
market should also bear the burdens encountered. See Littlefield, supra note 59, at 284.
However, it is possible that the loss will eventually be passed from the finance company to
the consumer if the finance company charges higher rates or restricts the flow of credit.6 2 See Kennard v. Reliance Inc., 257 Md. 654, 264 A.2d 832 (1970); Unico v. Owen, 50
N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); International Finance Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137
N.W.2d 172 (1965); Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649, 44 A.L.R.2d I (Fla.
1963); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Wks., 34 Cal.2d 766, 214 P.2d
819 (1950); and Consumer Credit Corp. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
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not followed the "close connectedness" doctrine outlined in Con-
sumer Credit Corp. v. Childs,6 in Unico v. Owen64 the New
Jersey Supreme Court considered this issue6 5 and wrote what is
generally considered to be the strongest opinion on behalf of the
doctrine. In Unico a retail buyer contracted for the purchase of a
large number of record albums. The record albums were to be
delivered over a five-year period, while the installment price was
to be paid over a three-year period. The retail dealer subsequently
became insolvent, and soon after delivery of the albums ceased
the retail buyer refused to make any more installment payments.
The finance company, Unico, sued to collect on the note it had
purchased from the dealer. The court, in a two-pronged decision,
ruled that waiver of defenses clauses in retail installment sales
were void as against public policy,6 6 and that the finance company
was too closely connected with the sale to qualify as a holder in
due course.6 7 Even if the Retail Installment Sales Act does not
apply to a specious cash sale, the New Jersey courts, by invoking
Although many of these cases were decided before the enactment of the UCC, it can be
argued that the result should be the same. First, under UCC § 3-302(l)(b) the assignee
must take in good faith in order to be a holder in due course. It is arguable that "good
faith" preculdes the finance company from participating in the underlying transaction:
In the field of negotiable instruments, good faith is a broad concept. The
basic philosophy of the holder in due course status is to encourage free
negotiability of commercial paper by removing certain anxieties of one who
takes the paper as an innocent purchaser knowing no reason why the paper is
not as sound as its face would indicate. It would seem to follow, therefore,
that the more the holder knows about the underlying transaction, and partic-
ularly the more he controls or participates or becomes involved in it, the less
he fits the role of a good faith purchaser for value ....
Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 109- 10, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (1967). Second, under UCCC
§ 3-305(2), a holder in due course can take the instrument free from the defenses of any
party only if the holder has "not dealt" with that party.
63 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
650 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
65 See Littlefield, supra note 59, at 275 -77. For a listing of other cases, see note 62
supra.
- 50 N.J. 101, 125-26, 232 A.2d 405, 418 (1967).6 7 The court specifically held:
For purposes of consumer goods transactions, we hold that where the
seller's performance is executory -in character and when it appears from the
totality of the arrangements between dealer and financer that the financer has
had a substantial voice in setting standards for the underlying transaction, or
has approved the standards established by the dealer, and has agreed to take
all or a predetermined or substantial quantity of the negotiable paper which is
backed by such standards, the financer should be considered a participant in
the original transaction and therefore not entitled to holder in due course
status.
50 N.J. 101, 122- 23, 232 A.2d 405, 417 (1967).
Although the Retail Installment Sales Act merely codifies the Unico holding with
respect to waiver of defense clauses, it extends Unico's restrictions on the application of
the holder in due course doctrine in retail installment sales. Unico only bars the use of the
holder in due course doctrine where the relationship between the retail seller and buyer
meets the close connectedness test; the Act imposes an absolute bar to the use of the
doctrine in retail installment sales.
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Unico, could still deny the application of the holder in due course
status to a finance company involved in such a sale.
When the court is confronted with a possible specious cash sale
case, it should resolve two issues with regard to the status of the
finance company: whether the transaction is a specious cash sale,
and if so, whether the holder in due course doctrine applies. The
factor that distinguishes a legitimate direct loan from a specious
cash sale is the degree to which the finance company is involved
in the transaction for the sale of the goods. 68 It seems to follow,
therefore, that the use of the close connectedness test could
provide a valid method for resolving the first question.6 9
There is, however, an inherent ambiguity in the close con-
nectedness test. If, for example, a prospective automobile buyer is
referred to a finance company by the dealer, it is uncertain wheth-
er the objective circumstances surrounding the referral should
govern or whether the dealer's intent should govern the sale.
Unico seems to adopt the objective standard approach 70 but the
answer is by no means clear and, as a result, commentators and
draftsmen have split widely on the issue. 71 No matter which
standard is followed, the close connectedness test still seems to
provide a viable method for determining the presence of a speci-
ous cash sale.
If the close connectedness test indicates that the transaction is
a specious cash sale, then it can be argued under Unico that this
same test requires that the finance company be denied the holder
in due course status. 72 Although it is arguable that Unico does not
6 8 See Legislative Note, supra note 13, at 149.
69 It is interesting to note that the law presently enacted (see note 58 supra) and the
proposed model provisions dealing with the specious cash sale (see NCA § 2.407 and
Littlefield, supra note 59, at 293-94) speak in terms of "close connection," "direct
relation," or "direct participation." The drafters have apparently turned to the language
and standards that have evolved in the courts to determine whether a person claiming to be
a holder in due course is in fact such a holder. The comments to NCA § 2.407 go as far as
to adopt expressly the precedents developed by the courts.
70 See note 67 supra.
71 On che one hand, the NCA apparently adopts objective standards. NCA § 2.407(2)
lists factual situations which are to be taken as conclusive proof that "the creditor
participated in or was directly connected with" the sale.
The New York law, see note 53 supra, lists factual situations meant to serve as
rebuttable presumptions of close connection. In this light, the New York law seems to
follow the objective standards approach. However, the New York law's scope is not
limited to the factual situations listed and other relevant evidence may be introduced either
to show "close connection" or to rebut the presumption of "close connection." In this
manner, the New York law could conceivably permit the use of subjective standards for
determining "close connection."
On the other extreme, a professor who has written extensively in the area proposed an
amendment to the UCCC which largely adopted subjective standards. See Littlefield,
supra note 59, at 293-94.
72 See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
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apply to the specious cash sale because it does not apply to a
retail installment sale in which a finance company has given a
"direct" loan, the court should still be able to go behind the form
to view the substance of the transaction. 73 If the loan is, in fact,
direct and if the participation of the retail seller is minimal, the
court should hold that the transaction is a loan, not a retail
installment sale. Conversely, where the retail seller plays a critical
role in securing the credit, the court should find that the transac-
tion is, in fact, a retail installment sale.
If the New Jersey courts refuse to solve the problem of the
specious cash sale, it is unlikely that the Act will afford much
protection for the retail buyer.74 Moreover, in a state that does
not follow Unico the only solution is for the state legislature to
enact legislation dealing specifically with the specious cash sale.
- Eric A. Oesterle
73 The courts have demonstrated already that they will go behind the form to view the
substance of a retail installment sale. For example, where the finance company has
directed the transaction between the lender and the maker of the note from its inception,
the finance company is not held to be a bona fide purchaser of the negotiable note, but is
regarded as a party to the original agreement. Its holder in due course status is thereby
negated. See Nassau Discount Corp. v. Allen, 44 Misc. 2d 1007, 255 N.Y.S.2d 608 (City
Ct. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 262 N.Y.S.2d 967 (App.T. 1965); Mutual Finance Co.
v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649, 44 A.L.R.2d I (Fla. 1953); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange
County Mach. Wks., 34 Cal.2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); Citizens Loan Corp. v.
Robbins, 40 So.2d 503 (App. Ct. La. 1949); and Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De Marzio,
162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y.. 783 (City Ct. 1937), rev'd on default, 6 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct.
1937).
14 It could be argued that even if the specious cash sales were allowed to defeat the
purpose of the new act, the fact that the finance companies and retail sellers would be
forced to use the specious cash sale to avoid losing their holder in due course status would
in effect defeat the "time-price" doctrine which allows the participants in a retail in-
stallment coptract to escape the reaches of the state usury laws. If the specious cash sale is
not viewed as a retail installment sale it must be viewed as a direct loan transaction, and
such transactions are not usually covered by the "time-price" exception. Nevertheless, the
policies of the Act itself would still be defeated.
